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CUTTING UP THE HUMBLE PIE:
A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO
APPORTIONING LITIGATION
RISKS AMONG UNDERWRITERS
JAMES C. FREUND* AND HENRY S. HACKER"
I. A STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM AND THE PROPOSAL
Underwriters of securities, for many years virtually ignored as the
object of lawsuits by disgruntled investors, have lately come into their
own as a tempting and solvent target for litigation., In this respect, they
are involuntary bedfellows of their professional brethren in the ac-
counting 2 and legal3 fields, portending an attack that can be expected to
intensify in the future.
The essence of modern-day securities underwriting is the syndi-
cate concept.4 An underwriting firm (commonly referred to as "man-
aging undervriter" or the "manager"5 ) takes the responsibility for
forming a syndicate, composed of itself and a number of other under-
writers (commonly referred to as "participating underwriters" or "par-
ticipants"), to market an issuer's securities. 6 Most aspects of the rela-
6BA., Princeton University, 1956; J.D. Harvard, 1962.
0* B.A., Yale University, 1965; J.D., Cornell, 1968.
I See, e.g., Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F, Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y, 1968) [herein-
after cited as BarChris]; Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969),
aft'g 287 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Globus I]; Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 318 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), af'd, 442
F.2d 1346 (2d Cir. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Globus II]; Feit v. Leasco Data processing
Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Feit]; Financial Indus.
Fund Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 315 F. Supp. 42 (D.C. Colo. 1971), rev'd, 474 F.2d
514 (10th Cir, 1973); Independent Investor Protective League v. New York Sec., Inc., 73
Civil No. 2824 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 1973), summary of complaint reported in [1973 Transfer
Binder] CCH FE. SEc. L. REP. 94,039.
2 See, e.g., BarChris, 283 F. Supp. at 697703. See generally ExPANDINr REsPONSMILrrMs
uNrE riE SECUErSas Aars 157-71 (J. FLom & L Loss, Co-Chairmen, N.Y.UJ, 1972); Hallett
& Collins, Auditors' Responsibility for Misrepresentation, 44 WAsHr. L. REv. 139 (1968).
3 See, e.g., SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 360 F. Supp. 284 (D.D.C. 1973).
See also Freeman, Liability of Counsel for Issuer, 24 Bus. LAw. 635 (1969); Henkel, Liability
of Counsel for Underwriter, 24 Bus. Lmv. 641 (1969); Karmel, Attorneys' Securities Laws
Liabilities, 27 Bus. LAw. 1153 (1972).
4 See text accompanying notes 28-38 infra.
5 There may be more than one manager in an undenriting, although for uniformity
we have used the term in the singular throughout the article. The managing underwriter
is also often referred to as the "representative of the underwriters."
6 The securities may be offered by the issuer itself, consisting of either previously
unissued or treasury securities or way be sold for the account of securities holders, or any
combination thereof. For purposes of this article, unless otherwise specified, we will assume
that the particular offering under discussion is being made directly by the issuer; although
the principles involved are generally applicable.
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tionship between the managing and participating underwriters are
carefully defined in the standard form of agreement among under-
writers7 (which we will refer to, in the jargon of the trade, as the
"Agreement Among"). Curiously, the one major area not covered in
the typical Agreement Among is the apportionment among under-
writers of the risks of litigation brought by investors or others, arising
out of the offering.
If there were little likelihood of such litigation, if the risks of
ultimate liability on the part of the underwriters were minimal, and if
the governing law on the subject were clear, then perhaps the omission
of a provision relating to potential litigation might be justifiable. In
point of fact, however, none of these conditions exists. At the same time
that litigation aimed at underwriters is proliferating, the liability ex-
posure of underwriters has been increased substantially by such recent
developments as the greater difficulty of establishing a "due diligence"
defense,8 the possible inability of underwriters to realize on their in-
demnification agreements with the issuer and selling stockholders, 9 and
the intrusion of expanded concepts of rule lOb-5 liability into the
underwriting context. 10
Moreover, the governing law on the subject is exceedingly unclear
at the present time, with no fixed answers to a number of questions.
For example, do different standards of due diligence exist for managing
and participating underwriters?" If (as seems to be the case) partici-
pating underwriters are not protected from liability in relying on
inadequate due diligence of the manager, will adequate due diligence
by the manager protect the participants? 2 Will the result in the Globus
I case, denying underwriters indemnification from the issuer in situa-
tions where the manager's conduct went beyond mere negligence, be
extended to instances where the manager is simply careless? 3 Does
7 For a representative sample of such an agreement, see G. ROBINSON & K. EPpLER,
GOING PUBLIC § 36 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as ROBINSON & EPPLER]. This agreement
relates to what is known as a "firm commitment" underwriting (as contrasted with "best
efforts" and "rights" or "standby" offerings), which is the prevalent mode of public cor-
porate finance today. This article is directed at firm commitment underwritings, per-
formed on a negotiated basis (as contrasted with those subject to competitive bidding).
8 See notes 52-53 and accompanying text infra.
9 See text accompanying notes 60-67 infra.
10 This rule was promulgated under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (1970) [hereinafter the 1934 Act]; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as the rule or rule lOb-5]. See text accompanying notes 46-50 infra.
11 See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5275 at 10-12 (July 26, 1972); Note, Section 11 of
the Securities Act: The Unresolved Dilemma of Participating Underwriters, 40 FoRsHAm
L. Rav. 869 (1972).
12 See text accompanying notes 57-61 infra.
13 See note 67 infra and accompanying text.
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contribution under section 11(f) of the Securities Act of 193314 as
amended (the "1933 Act"), cover amounts paid by way of settlement and
necessary legal fees incurred in defending the claim?15 What rights
of contribution, if any, exist in the context of litigation under rule
lOb-5?16 Should the answer to any of the foregoing questions turn on
which of the underwriters is sued?17
Recently, in partial response to some of these questions, the Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission (Commission) and the National Associ-
ation of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) have entered the picture
through some tentative regulatory attempts to tinker with due dili-
gence.' 8 A few underwriters have made initial forays into spreading the
litigation risk through contractual provisions.1
At the risk of over-generalizing, it would appear that certain char-
acteristics of the investment banking industry suggest the advisability
of forging a common solution in advance of the problem. The typical
investment banker may act as manager of a particular offering on a
Tuesday, and as a participant in several other underwritings on
Wednesday and Thursday; a rigid posture in one of these roles could
work to his ultimate disadvantage in the other. Traditionally, invest-
ment bankers are not disposed toward litigation among themselves,
but rather their practice has been inclined toward gentlemanly accom-
modation.2 0 Underwriters have long sought ways and means of avoiding
their particular spectre - uncertainty of any kind. Finally, the syndi-
cate itself stands as a time-tested monument to consensual risk-sharing.21
In light of these traditions and attitudes, it makes good sense for
the industry to come to grips with the questions of comparative litiga-
tion risks. To further the necessary dialogue, we are proposing in this
article a plausible compromise solution.22 It takes the form of a new
provision for inclusion in the Agreement Among, aimed at: (a) intro-
ducing a fair amount of certainty into the picture in advance of the
occurrence of particular problems; (b) distinguishing between garden
variety negligence and the more egregious types of managing under-
writers' behavior such as knowledgeable misrepresentation - relegating
the underwriters to their respective legal rights and remedies in the
14 15 U.S.C. § 77K(f) (1970) [hereinafter cited as the 1933 Act].
15 See notes 88-89 infra and accompanying text.
10 See text accompanying notes 71-72 infra.
17 See text accompanying notes 72-90 infra.
1s See text accompanying notes 91-99 infra.
19 See text accompanying note 100 infra.
20 See text accompanying notes 83-84 infra.
21 See note 28 infra.
22 See Section V infra at 482.
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latter case, while spreading the burden on an assumption-of-the-risk
rationale in the former situation; (c) mitigating any legal distinctions
that might otherwise be introduced by the plaintiff's decision as to
whom to sue and the statutory basis for the suit; and (d) providing for
the problems of legal representation and settlement of the case, to-
gether with their attendant costs.
To be sure, this proposed solution raises certain questions. Should
participating underwriters be forced to share the burden of a faulty
investigation by the managing underwriter?2 Should participating
underwriters be committed to the manager's choice of counsel in de-
fending the litigation?24 Are there any ethical conflict of interest
problems inherent in one attorney representing both the manager and
participants in the litigation?25 Should all of the underwriters be re-
quired to join in a settlement approved by a stated majority?26 Does
the provision violate any public policy as enunciated by the courts or
the Commission?27
While it is believed that there are suitable answers to the fore-
going questions, we also realize that, given the judgmental nature of
the subject matter, a variety of different conclusions can be reached.
The purpose of this article is to provoke a beneficial discussion of the
subject by underwriters and their counsel, which hopefully will lead
to a resolution of the issues satisfactory to the industry, the courts and
the Commission.
II. A BRIEF DISSERTATION ON MODERN-DAY UNDERWRITING
Origination, Syndication and Distribution
Underwriting is a tripartite process - consisting of origination,
syndication and distribution - through which corporate securities reach
the investing public.28 Within this process, managing and participating
underwriters each play a part, but their roles are significantly different.
The origination phase, which involves the advisory and investiga-
tory aspects of underwriting leading up to the filing of a 1983 Act
Registration Statement, is handled generally by one or more2 invest-
23 See text accompanying notes 135-40 infra.
24 See note 135 and accompanying text infra.
25 Id.
26 See Section V infra at p. 482.
27 See Section V infra at p. 482.
28 For a survey of the underwriting process see TnE STOCK MARKET HANDBOOK 54-70,
482-90 (F. Zarb & C. Kerekes eds. 1970); FINANCIAL HANDBOOK §§ 9.9-9.27 (3d ed. J. Bogen
1964). For a history of the development of syndication in the United States see V. CAROSSA,
INvmMENT BANKING IN AMERICA-A HISTORY 51-78 (1970).
29 See note 5 supra.
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ment bankers who invariably manage the offering. During this stage a
general understanding (which is often embodied in a letter of intent)
is reached between the issuer and the manager as to their joint willing-
ness to proceed and the principal terms of the contemplated offering,
including a general price range and the level of underwriters' com-
pensation.
When this understanding is reached, the manager, his attorneys,
and at times other experts retained by this manager will undertake the
bulk of the due diligence investigation" (although a continual up-
dating should be performed throughout the underwriting process). The
investigation consists of an in-depth probing of the business, financial
and legal facts of the issuer's life, involving examination of a plethora
of documents, numerous face-to-face meetings with management, audi-
tors and attorneys, on-site inspection of the company's facilities, and
independent verification through outside sources of the salient aspects
of the issuer's business and finances.
Once the registration statement (including a preliminary pro-
spectus) has been filed with the Commission, and the preliminary pro-
spectus is circulated throughout the investment banking community,
the syndication phase begins. It is only at this stage that the participat-
ing underwriters enter the scene, and even then usually in a very limited
capacity. The manager determines which underwriters will be invited
into the syndicate, consistent with the traditions of the bracketing
system which determines the relative size of the respective under-
writing positions.31 In most cases, invitees base their decisions to join
the syndicate principally on the reputation of the manager, on an
analysis of the registration statement and underwriting documents, and
perhaps on a brief appraisal by the participating firm's research depart-
ment of the security being offered.
The dominance of the manager continues through the distribution
phase. The manager allocates to the respective participants the amount
of securities each will be permitted to sell to their own customers.3 2
80 Due diligence takes its name from the defenses contained in sections 11(b) and (c)
of the 1933 Act. See Folk, Civil Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Actds: The BarChris
Case (pts. 1 & 2), 55 VA. L. Ray. 1, 199 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Folk]; Symposium -
The BarChris Case: Prospectus Liability, 24 Bus. IAw. 523 (1969). See generally TEHNIQUES
OF DUE DxuGENCE (J. PURCELL, Chairman, PIU 1973).
31 Although this can vary appreciably, the manager's underwriting position generally
amounts to approximately twenty percent of the issue, or, if there are co-managers, to
approximately fifteen percent each. For an interesting summary of this little-known and
somewhat arcane area of Wall Street see Hayes, Investment Banking: Power Structure in
Flux, 49 HAgv. Bus. REv. 136 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Hayes], in which such matters
as the relative sizes of underwriting positions and the reasons therefor are discussed.
32 This allocation will not necessarily be equal to a participant's underwriting posi-
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Although the manager may solicit and certain participants may inde-
pendently volunteer views as to the ultimate pricing of the issue, all
price negotiations typically take place solely between the issuer and the
manager.
Generally, the sole contact between the participants and the issuer
takes place at a so-called "due diligence" meeting, which normally
occurs several days prior to the offering. For the most part, this
gathering represents the only opportunity for participating under-
writers to meet the company's management and to pose questions di-
rectly to the officers. In practice, however, these meetings are usually
attended by the participants' most junior associates, who tend to be
uninformed about the company and sit mutely while the president
waxes eloquently about his company's prospects. 33 It is extremely rare
for participants to undertake independent efforts to obtain first-hand
information about the issuer.
For their collective efforts, the underwriters will be compensated
by the underwriting discount or "gross spread," representing the dif-
ference between the price at which the underwriters purchase the
securities from the issuer and the public offering price.34 The size of
the spread is negotiated between the issuer and the manager. The spread
is then broken down by the manager into three basic components,35
each of which represents a different functional aspect of underwriting.
The management fee, for originating and managing the offering, com-
prises approximately twenty percent of this spread and is retained by
the manager.3 6 The underwriting commission, roughly thirty percent
of the spread, is allocated to the underwriters (including the manager)
on the basis of their respective underwriting participations. The selling
concession, approximately fifty percent of the spread, is allocated to the
underwriters (including the manager) or selling group members37 on
the basis of the amount of securities sold by each firm.
tion. Pursuant to authority contained in the Agreement Among, the manager generally
withholds a certain quantity of securities from the participants for apportionment to
selected dealers or to large institutions on behalf of the group, or to the manager itself
(or other underwriters) for distribution to clients. This enables the manager to keep
tighter control over the distribution of the issue.
33 This reality has been explicitly acknowledged by the Commission. SEC Securities
Act Release No. 5275 at 12-13 (July 26, 1972).
34 The spread will vary anywhere from one to ten percent depending on the type of
security to be offered, the nature of the offering, the stature of the issuer, and competitive
factors. See Hayes, supra note 31, at 137.
35 Id.
36 At times the manager will receive additional compensation from the issuer in the
form of warrants or "cheap stock." This type of compensation exposes the manager to
greater liability under section 11(e) of the 1933 Act; see note 49 infra.
37 The selling group members are generally smaller or regional investment firms who
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In sum, it can be seen that in all aspects of the underwriting
process other than the actual retailing of the securities, the participant
assumes a secondary and essentially passive role. The underwriting pro-
cess reflects the expedient delegation by the participants to the manag-
ing underwriter of the important decisions of the offering. Practically
speaking, the participants impliedly assume the risks of the supervisory
and investigatory abilities of the managing underwriter. At least in the
crucial due diligence area, this comports with practical realities, since
to require each of the numerous participating underwriters to under-
take an exhaustive investigation of the issuer would be both redun-
dant38 and, in terms of each participant's small portion of the overall
offering, uneconomical. The Commission, taking administrative notice
of this problem, has sanctioned the delegation of the due diligence
function, so long as the participants satisfy themselves that the manager
has made a thorough and adequate investigation.3" This practice of
extensive delegation, already existing in the underwriting community,
forms the basis for our proposed solution to the problems of litigation
risk.
The Agreement Among Underwriters
The Agreement Among carries over the concept of delegation into
the legal sphere. This document, which is entered into by the under-
writers immediately prior to each public offering, defines the relation-
ship between the manager and participants, and provides in minute
detail for the delegation of a large measure of authority to the man-
ager.40
It is significant to note that the provisions of the Agreement Among
will purchase a small portion of the issue from the underwriters for distribution to the
public, but who have no underwriting or purchase obligations to the issuer. They are not
considered to be statutory underwriters under section 2(11) of the 1933 Act. See H. BLOOm-
ENTHAL, SECURtrrIES AND FEDERAL CORPoORATE LAW § 8.10 (1972) [hereinafter cited as BLOOM-
ENTHAL].
38 Commentators have frequently pointed'out that the value of numerous investiga-
tions into the same subject matter would likely be inconsequential. See, e.g., Folk, supra
note 30, at 57. Moreover, additional probes would cause increased time demands on the
issuer's management, over and above the considerable number of hours they already spend
in the registration process.
39 See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5275 at 12 (July 26, 1972); Section IV infra at p. -.
40 See ROBINSON & EPPLER, supra note.7, at § 86. In the typical Agreement Among, the
manager is authorized to enter into the underwriting agreement with the issuer, to allocate
securities, to withhold securities for sale to institutions and selected dealers, to overallot
securities, to commence the public offering, to vary the public offering price, to effect
stabilizing transactions, and to advance or borrow funds on behalf of the participants for
payment to the issuer. On the other hand, the participants' rights are limited; they can
only sell the securities in conformity with the terms disclosed in the prospectus, and are
prohibited from making stabilizing transactions or otherwise engaging in open market
transactions.
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are not solely directed to a smoothly functioning public offering. On the
contrary, the Agreement Among attempts to isolate and deal with a
number of potentially troublesome situations in the underwriting
process. For example, the manager is empowered, in the context of an
unsuccessful offering, to change the public offering price, to stabilize,
and to dispose of withheld or repurchased shares at his discretion after
termination of the offering. If an underwriter defaults on his purchase
commitment, elaborate substitution provisions can be invoked. Thus,
the omission of provisions dealing with litigation risks cannot be ra-
tionalized on the ground that underwriters have traditionally main,
tained an ostrich-like attitude toward problem areas, avoiding
contemplation of the unthinkable; the Agreement Among bears
witness to the greater concern of underwriters for certainty in their
relations.
The basic principle underlying the Agreement Among is the sev-
eral (as contrasted with joint) liability of underwriters.41 Each under-
writer separately promises to purchase only a specified portion of the
total securities underwritten, thus limiting each underwriter's obliga,
tions and liabilities to the issuer. 42 This severality concept does not
operate to deny contribution under the 1933 Act,48 nor would it be
legally inconsistent with the approach proposed herein. Furthermore,
since severality is a means of limiting underwriters' liability to prevent
a burdensome and unequal judgment from falling upon one under-
writer, a contractual provision to further sharing of the litigation risk
would seem to be entirely appropriate. 44
III. A SURVEY OF THE LIIGAL ASPECTS OF UNDERWRITERS' LIABILITY
The Basis for Liability; Defenses
The standard weapon in the arsenal of a plaintiff seeking redress
against underwriters has long been section 11 of the 1933 Act, which
41 See VOBINSON & EPPLER, supra note 7, at § 36. In this proviso it is also stated that
the manager shall be under no liability to the participants, except for obligations ex-
pressly assumed in the Agreement Among and for liabilities imposed by the 1933 Act.
42 1 L. Loss, Sacuarrms REGULATION 167 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss]. This
arose as a contractual device to make operative the provisions of section 11(e) of the 1933
Act (adopted in 1934), limiting each underwriter's liability to its respective purchase com-
mitment. Prior thereto, underwriting obligations were joint, which gave rise to an obliga-
tion on the part of each underwriter to purchase the entire offering from the issuer. See
United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 647 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
48 See 3 Loss, supra note 42, at 1728 n.149, in which he discusses the interrelationship
betwee% limitations on underwriters' liability contained in section 11(e) of the 1933 Act
and contribution among underwriters.
44 The Agreement Among already contains provisions which can be characterized as
"joint," relating to, among other things, the apportionment of expenses and the sale by
the manager of withheld securities on behalf of the group. See ROBINSON & EPPLER, supra
note 7, at § 36.
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covers a multitude of underwriters' sins ranging from negligent omis-
sion of a material fact in a registration statement to willful and inten-
tional fraud in connection with a public offering.45 Although the statu-
tory liabilities imposed upon underwriters were initially met with con-
sternation and dismay,46 subsequent amendments to the 1933 Act and
the passage of time have made these provisions at least tolerable to the
investment banking community. With the expansion of the private
remedy under rule lOb-5 into the underwriting context,47 however,
an additional blunderbuss was added to the plaintiff's armaments,
causing fresh reverberations on Wall Street.48
Although the rule has not imposed any additional substantive lia-
bility upon underwriters, 40 the class of potential plaintiffs has been
broadened 0 and judicial applications have tended to brush aside some
of the mitigating elements of section 11, thereby exposing under-
writers to additional uncertainties and risks. For example, under the
1933 Act each underwriter's exposure to damages is limited by section
11(e) to the price of the securities it actually underwrites and dis-
tributes;r1 and section 11(g) limits the total amount recoverable from
all defendants in a section 11 action to the aggregate public offering
price of the entire issue. 2 Neither of these limitations exists under
45 1933 Act § 11. The general purpose of this section of the 1933 Act was to impose
upon those persons involved in the undenvriting process liability for negligent conduct,
which would not have been actionable under the common law requirements for fraud or
deceit. See BLOOmENTHAL, supra note 37, at § 8.08.
46 See Ballantine, Amending the Federal Securities Act, 20 A.B.A.J. 85 (1934); Dooley,
The Effects of Civil Liability on Investment Banking and the New Issues Markets, 8 VA.
L. REV. 776 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Dooley].
47 See Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188
F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951): Orn v. Eastman Dillon, Union Sec. & Co., 864 F. Supp. 352 (C.D.
Cal. 1973). For the Commission's views as to the applicability of rule 10b,5 to the under-
writing context and the non-exclusivity of section 11 see a summary of its amicus curiae
brief in Orn, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Con Fmn. Svc. L. Rn,. 93,760. Dooley, supra
note 46, at 810-27, contains a thorough analysis of the effect of rule lob-S on investment
bankers.48 Dooley, supra note 46, at 833-42.
49 In fact, the scope of liability under rule 10b-5 might well be narrower than under
section 11, since at present a substantial controversy exims as to whether negligent behavior
is privately actionable under rule lOb-5. The initial interpretations of rule lob-5 requiring
some element of scienter (knowledgeable or fraudulent misrepresentation) have for some
time now been in the process of erosion. The Ninth Circuit has done away %With this re-
quirement altogether, and would impose liability for negligent behavior under rule lob-5.
See Ellis v. Carter, 291 V.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961). See also Dooley, supra note 46, at 814-15,
826-27; BLOOnmNTXiAL, sttpra note 27, at § 8125[3].
GO See Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951). See also Barnes v.
Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1967), Colonial Realty Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 257 F.
Supp. 875 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
511933 Act § 11(e). This lhnitatiota can, however, be negated for a particular under-
writer if he receives additional compensation from the issuer in the form of warrants or
"cheap stock." As a result of this provision, certain investment bankers have adopted a
policy against taking compensation in this form.
52 1933 Act § 11(g). Thus, for example, if investors buy securities covered by a prospec-
1974]
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rule lOb-5. In addition, the statute of limitations for a section 11
action (contained in section 13 of the 1933 Act) is considerably shorter
than under rule 1Ob-5. 5
The principal underwriters' shield against claims under the 1933
Act has been the "due diligence" defense, as embodied in sections 11 (b)
and (c).5 4 It is grounded in the "reasonable man" element of the law
of negligence, imposing a standard of prudent conduct for the under-
writers' actions in connection with the preparation of the registration
statement and distribution of the securities. The underwriter will not
incur liability if, on the basis of a reasonable investigation into the
affairs of the issuer, the underwriter reasonably believes that there are
no misstatements and omissions in the registration statement. A success-
ful due diligence defense of this nature would presumably also absolve
underwriters in a rule lOb-5 action.55
The requisites of preparing and sustaining a due diligence defense
on behalf of underwriters are beyond the scope of this article. It should
be noted, however, that establishing such a defense is far from simple,
inasmuch as there are no fixed standards as to reasonableness, and the
adequacy of the investigation is determined from the vantage point
of judicial hindsight. Recent cases illustrate this difficulty by insisting
on an exhaustive investigation into all aspects of the issuer's business. 6
As mentioned above, 57 in current underwriting practice the man-
ager is delegated the function of performing the due diligence investi-
gation on behalf of the syndicate. The practical effect of this delega-
tion is that, if the manager fails to perform the investigation properly,
the inactive defendant-participant will also be held liable, at least in
the context of a section 11 lawsuit.5 8 Whether the converse is true, i.e.,
tus in the after-market at a price higher than the original public offering price, and such
securities later become worthless, a defendant-underwriter in a rule lOb-5 action would
face potential damages based on the full loss to the purchasers, not limited by either the
underwriter's participation in the offering or the public offering price. See SEC Securities
Act Release No. 45 (Sept. 22, 1933); Dooley, supra note 46, at 824-27.
53 See Orn v. Eastman Dillon, Union Sec. & Co., 364 F. Supp. 352 (C.D. Cal. 1973);
Dooley, supra note 46, at 822-24. See also Martin, Statutes of Limitation in 1Ob-5 Actions:
Which State Statute is Applicable?, 29 Bus. LAW. 443 (1974).
54 1933 Act § ll(b),(c). See also note 30 supra.
55 Although rule lOb-5 does not explicitly provide for a "due diligence" defense, and
although confusion does exist with regard to whether the rule covers underwriters' negli-
gent conduct (see note 49 supra), in sustaining a due diligence defense underwriters have
in effect proved that they acted in neither a negligent nor fraudulent manner.
56 In addition to other areas of concern, consider the comprehensive due diligence
investigation conducted by the underwriters (consisting of numerous meetings with, and
reports by, insurance and disclosure experts) into the area of "surplus-surplus" in Feit,
332 F. Supp. at 561-62, 581-83. Judge Weinstein appeared to find such investigation barely
adequate. Id. at 582.
57 See text acompanying note 30 supra.
58 BarChris, 283 F. Supp. at 697.
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whether the participants will be protected if the manager sustains his
due diligence defense, is somewhat of an open question, although such
a result seems clearly reasonable. 59 To arrive at a contrary conclusion
in either of these situations would require the creation of differing
standards of due diligence for managing and participating under-
writers, a dichotomy which the courts have yet to recognize. 60 This
concept of derivative liability and absolution is critical to any analysis
of the proposed approach to sharing litigation risks.61
Indemnification
The traditional method by which underwriters have sought to
protect themselves from potential liabilities to investors has been
through the indemnification contract with the issuer.62 The theory of
indemnification is to shift liability from one person who may be legally
liable to another who, for reasons of equity based on presumably
greater fault, should more properly bear its burden.6 3 In the under-
writing context, the primary responsibility for preparation of the
registration statement falls on the issuer, which is in the best position
r9 See Folk, supra note 30, at 57. An analogy can be drawn to the situation in Felt, a
case involving two dealer-managers in an exchange offer, where the satisfactory due dili-
gence investigation by one dealer-manager was deemed to have absolved the other. 332 F.
Supp. at 583.
CO On its face, section 11 of the 1933 Act does not distinguish between managing and
participating underwriters in terms of due diligence obligations. But see text accompanying
note 39 supra for the views of the Commission. If the courts were to adopt the reasoning
of the Commission to the effect that a participating underwriter's due diligence burden
may not be as heavy as the manager's (i.e., the participant need not actually verify the
completeness and accuracy of the information contained in the Registration Statement,
but must satisfy himself that the manager has done so), then such derivative liability
would not necessarily follow. See also note 73 infra; Note, Section 11 of the Securities Act:
The Unresolved Dilemma of Participating Underwriters, 40 FORDHAa! L. REV. 869, 886-88
(1972), for further discussion of this issue. See also note 73 infra.
61 See text accompanying notes 137-40 infra.
62 In order to secure an additional degree of protection and particularly to guard
against the issuer's insolvency, investment bankers have in the past turned to insurance.
Certain well established investment banking firms have purchased blanket policies gov-
erning liabilities under the securities laws, some of which apparently remain in effect
today; it is understood, however, that new policies of this nature are no longer being
issued. See Appelbaum & McDowell, Indemnification Against Securities Act Liabilities, 27
Bus. LAw. 131, 137 (Supp. Issue 1972). Another form of insurance policy can be purchased
on an issue-by-issue basis, although these are normally written only in secondary offerings
by selling stockholders of highly established companies. See Kroll, Some Reflections on In-
demnification Provision and S.E.C. Liability Insurance in Light of BarChris and Globus,
24 Bus. LAw. 681, 686-87 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Kroll]. Because of the limited avail-
ability and the spiraling costs of this kind of insurance, it would not appear to be a
major factor in resolving the problems raised in this article.
63 See W. PRossER, IAw oF ToRTS 310 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PRossER];
Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Con.
spiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 597, 647
(1972) hereinafter cited as Ruder].
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to know fully and to present adequately the facts concerning its
business. Thus, when there are serious deficiencies in a registration
statement, the long finger of responsibility usually points at the issuer.6
In recognition of this concept, underwriters have invariably insisted
that their purchase agreement with the company contain indemnifica-
tion provisions, pursuant to which the issuer will hold the underwriters
harmless against any loss resulting from an inaccurate or incomplete
registration statement. The only exception is for those few portions
of the registration statement specifically prepared by the underwriters
(such as the distribution arrangements), as to which the underwriters
typically indemnify the issuer.6 5
It has long been recognized in the law that the freedom of parties
to contract for indemnification is subject to overriding considerations
of public policy. 6 In this regard, the Commission has consistently
taken the position that it is contrary to public policy, as expressed
in the 1933 Act, for companies to indemnify their officers or directors
for securities laws violations.67 Although the Commission has never
adopted this stance with respect to the indemnification of underwriters
by issuers, the courts have now seized the initiative from the adminis-
trators.
In the Globus I case, the Second Circuit concluded that it would
be improper for such policy reasons to allow an underwriter indemnifi-
cation from the issuer in a situation where the underwriter had actual
knowledge of material omissions in a disclosure document and had
failed to insist upon the inclusion of such material.68 The court rea-
soned that to permit indemnification would have the effect of causing
64 This inference has been implicitly recognized in the 1933 Act, which denies the issuer
a due diligence defense under section 11, thereby imposing virtually strict liability. See
BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 37, at § 8.13.
65 See RoBINSON & EppLER, supra note 7, at § 52 for sample indemnification provisions
of this nature,
66 See Ruder, supra note 63, at 654-55.
67 17 C.F.R, § 230.460 n.a (1973), under the 1933 Act provides that, as a prerequisite
to acceleration of a registration statement, the issuer must aclmowledge in the registration
statement the Commission's position with regard to such indemnification and agree to
submit any claim for indemnification to a court for a binding adjudication. See Kroll, supra
note 62, at 688-89. See also the summary of the Commission's amicus brief in Feit (in which
both a corporation and certain directors were held liable) concerning its opposition to the
payment of the entire judgment by the corporate defendant, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. RP. J 93,415. The authors have been advised that the directors ulti-
mately contributed relatively small amounts to the judgment.
68 418 F.2d at 1288. Globus I involved an offering of securities under the Regulation A
exemption, and thus the ensuing claims, based on a false and misleading offering circular,
were brought under section 17 (rather than section 11) of the 1933 Act. Presumably, the
result would have been the same if a registration statement were involved and the claim
brought under section 11 or rule lOb-5. See also Ruder) supra note 63, at 657 n.273.
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the indemnified party to be less than thorough in his preparation or
investigation of the registration statement; and that, by enforcing the
indemnification against the issuer, the court would be indirectly harm-
ing precisely those persons (namely, the stockholders of the issuer who
had purchased their shares in the offering) whom the law seeks to pro.
tect.
The denial of indemnification in Globus I was for what the
Second Circuit characterized as "a sin graver than ordinary negli-
gence" 69 on the part of the underwriters. Such sin would obviously em-
brace intentional fraud, recklessness and even gross negligence. There
is no decision as yet on whether indemnification would be denied in a
case where the underwriters were merely negligent, but it is not un-
foreseeable that such a result could eventually obtain.70
Contribution
The apparent hostility of the Commission and the courts toward
indemnification, coupled with the recognition that indemnification is
of dubious value when the issuer is in shaky financial condition, has
led underwriters to the unhappy conclusion that they cannot safely rely
on it to protect themselves against federal securities law liabilities. This
has sparked a corresponding rise in interest among underwriters and
their attorneys in the principles of contribution, which mandate a
sharing of liability among culpable persons.71
In contrast to indemnification, which has no statutory basis in the
securities laws, contribution is expressly countenanced by section 11(f)
of the 1933 Act." The section provides that anyone liable under section
11 can compel others, who if sued separately would have been similarly
liable, to share in the ultimate payment; 78 the only exception occurs if
the person seeking contribution has been guilty of "fraudulent misrep-
resentation" and the other has not. There is no similar express statutory
basis for contribution in a rule lOb-5 action, but at least one court has
implied such a right.74
89 418 F.2d at 1288.
70 See Kroll, supra note 62, at 692. It is interesting to note that the Commission makes
no distinction between gross negligence and negligence with respect to its position on
indemnification of directors and officers. See note 67 supra.
71 For a general discussion of contribution see Ruder, supra note 63, at 647-51.
72 Contribution exists under sections 9(e) and 18(b) of the 1984 Act but neither of these
provisions applies directly to contribution under rule lob-5.
73 At the time of its enactment, this provision was seen as a direct reversal of the
American common laW rule which denied contribution among joint tortfeasors. See 3 Loss,
supra note 42, at 1787. The statutory endorsement of contribution, plus the imposition of
joint and several liability on section 11 violators, provides incentive for every person
connected with the underwriting to perform diligently.
74 deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809 (D. Colo. 1968), af'd in part and
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Unfortunately, there are very few cases dealing with this matter
under the federal securities laws, 75 and none which speaks to the issue of
contribution among underwriters. This creates many uncertainties in
both the legal and practical applications of the doctrine.
The problems of contribution are less acute, especially for the
manager, in a lawsuit in which all underwriters are included in the
original action, as contrasted with the difficult third-party questions
(referred to below) when the manager alone is sued. Nevertheless, it is
conceivable that the manager could be denied contribution in at least
two instances where all the parties are before the court. In a case where
the manager has been negligent but the participants are able to prove
that they were diligent, the manager would not be entitled to contri- -
bution under section 11(f), which requires that the person against
whom contribution is asserted be liable for the same payment. 76 And
in a case under rule lOb-5, where the manager is liable because of
conduct amounting to fraud but the participants' negligence is not
considered to rise to the necessary standard for liability, contribution
would presumably be denied on the theory that the participant was
not a joint tortfeasor.77
There is a further contribution problem for underwriters in cases
where a judgment is rendered against all of them. The 1933 Act pro-
vides no guide as to how each is to share in the total liability.7s It can
be presumed that the plaintiff will seek to execute his judgment against
one or at most a handful of the most solvent and accessible defendants;
vacated in part, 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970). The court reached this result on the basis
of section 11(f) of the 1933 Act and sections 9 and 18 of the 1934 Act. Id. at 815-16. More-
over, contribution was also required in Globus 11, where the original action was brought
under section 17, the 1933 Act analogue of rule lOb-5. See note 68 supra.
75See note 71 supra; Getter v. R.G. Dickinson & Co., [1973 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. RE'. 94,185 (S.D. Iowa 1973); Lyons v. Marrud, Inc., [1967-69 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. Sac. L. REP. 92,307 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Lyons v. Marrud, Inc., 46 F.R.D.
451 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
76 1934 Act § 11(f). As a practical matter, if participating underwriters continue not
to undertake any independent due diligence, they will be subject to derivative liability
based on the manager's negligence. See BarChris, 283 F. Supp. at 697. However, if partici-
pants began to assume a more active role or if it were to be judicially accepted that par-
ticipating underwriters had a lesser standard of due diligence to meet then such a result
might not be so uncommon. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5275 (July 26, 1972). See
also note 60 supra.
77 See BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 37, at § 8.271].
78 This problem, of course, is not limited solely to contribution among underwriters.
Most lawsuits relating to an underwriting will have a full cast of characters, including
the issuer, its officers and directors-and perhaps its accountants, as well as the under-
writers - among whom contribution must be shared. In the wake of Globus I, underwriters
have at times sought contractually to provide in advance for contribution between them-
selves and the issuer. For a representative sample of such a clause (which appears in certain




the managing underwriter is likely to find himself among this group.
Those who bear the brunt of the levy may then have to bring a second
action for contribution under section 11 (f)- hardly a desirable pros-
pect following hard upon one traumatic lawsuit.70 The results of this
contribution action would be far from certain, and the court could
enunciate a standard for sharing costs that would not comport with the
parties' expectations.8 0
The problems relating to contribution become more difficult for
the manager when he is the only one among the underwriters to be
named in the action. A plaintiff may forego naming each of the under-
writers in an action either because of the time and expense of serving a
large number of defendants or simply because he feels comfortable
with one or several solvent defendants, thereby forcing the manager
to claim over against his own group for contribution. The crucial
question is whether the manager will want to, or be able to, bring the
participating underwriters into the original action."- Rule 14 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides a defendant with a right
to join or implead another person who is or may be liable to him for
all or part of the plaintiff's original claim against him.82 Reading rule
14 together with section 11(f), the manager would thus be entitled to
have all issues joined in one lawsuit.83 Since impleader is a permissive
70 This state of affairs is precisely what happened in the Globus cases. After the
initial determination of liability in Globus I, and the execution of the judgment against
the underwriter, a second court proceeding, Globus 11, was necessary to determine how
to divide the original judgment among the multiple defendants.
80 Globus II, in Solomon-like fashion, provided for a pro rata solution to the problem,
simply dividing the amount of liability equally among the culpable parties. 318 F. Supp.
at 958. Since only one underwriter was involved, it is not clear how liability would have
been apportioned among managing and participating underwriters. While the pro rata
solution to the problem may have been appropriate under the particular facts of the
Globus 11 case, its general application as a means of apportioning liability among under-
writers should be seriously questioned. As noted earlier, most underwriting syndicates are
made up of numerous underwriters with varying purchase obligations. See notes 31-32 supra
and accompanying text. If the rule of Globus 11 was followed, those underwriters with
smaller participations would be required to bear a disproportionate share of the litigation
liability as compared with those underwriters (including the manager) with larger interests
in the syndicate.
sl It has been argued, based on a somewhat tortured reading of section 11(f), that the
right of contribution exists only among those parties named in the original lawsuit. This
is not in accord with the rationale for contribution, namely to ensure a fairer allocation
of liability among all culpable parties, and has been rejected by the one case on the sub-
ject. Getter v. R.G. Dickinson & Co., [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FE. SEc. L. REP. 94,185
(S.D. Iowa 1973).
82 Such third-party claim may be made as a matter of right within ten days after
the defendant has filed his answer; thereafter, the defendant must obtain court approval
before joining other parties. FE. R. Civ. P. 14.
83 Lyons v. Marrud Inc., [1967-69 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 92,307
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); Lyons v. Marrud, Inc., 46 F.R.D. 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), for a discussion
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practice, the manager would not be barred from bringing a separate
action for contribution if he chose not-to implead the participants in
the original action; 84 however, this could prove more expensive for
the manager or potentially lead to differing, less favorable results.
Practical considerations may dictate that the manager not assert
his rights of contribution against the participants, either through im-
pleader or in a separate action. In the absence of an explicit contractual
provision on the subject among the members of the syndicate, the man-
ager, as a matter of business judgment and ongoing relations in the
underwriting community, may not want to exacerbate the effects of
an already unsuccessful underwriting by suing his syndicate - prefer-
ring for reasons of reputation to quietly assume the potential liability
himself, especially where that liability would be limited by section
11 (e).S 5
If the manager does decide to implead the participants, there is
still a major stumbling block to his ability to consolidate in one forum
both the issues of original liability to the plaintiff and his rights of
contribution vis-?-vis the participants. This is caused by the fact that
most (although not necessarily all) underwriters will be members of
the New York and/or American Stock Exchanges. The constitutions of
both stock exchanges provide for mandatory arbitration in cases of
controversies between members of the respective exchanges whenever
one of the parties to the controversy requests such a procedure.,, Fur-
thermore, in disputes between non-members and members, the New
York Stock Exchange requires the member firm to submit to arbitra-
tion at the request of the non-member. The courts have rigidly en-
forced these exchange provisions as agreements to arbitrate.8 7 Since
these provisions could operate to keep certain members of the under-
writing group out of the court litigation, and since it may be against
public policy for all member and nonmember participants in the under-
writing to agree in advance to arbitration,"" this may result in the man-
relating to jurisdiction and statutes of limitation in the context of a third-party claim
under the 1933 Act.
84 See Union Paving Co. v. Thomasi 9 F.R.D. 612 (E.D. Pa. 1949); 3 J. MooaE, FEDERAL
PRAcrIcE 1 14.06 (2d ed. 1972).
88 See text accompanying note 49 supra.
86 N.Y.S.E. CONSr. art. VIII, § 1; AMEx. CONsr. art. VIII, § 1,
87 See Brown v. Gilligan, Will & Co., 287 F. Supp. 766 (SD.N.Y. 1968), a case where
one American Stock Exchange member, in a fourth-party action, sought indemnification
from another member. In the face of the defendant's objection, however, the court stayed
the claim over, pending arbitration. Id. at 776, See also BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 37, at
§ 8.28[2].
88 See Brown v. Gilligan, Will & Co., 287 F. Supp. 766, 772-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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ager having no single forum in which to proceed against the partici-
pants, unless they all agree t6 arbitrate after the fact.
In any action where underwriters are named as defendants, the
issue of settlement of the action is likely to become quite important.
The issuer may be insolvent in which case the burden of an adverse
judgment might fall heavily on the underwriters. Or the underwriters
may wish to settle in order to avoid besmirching their reputations with
a judicial finding of fault.
Putting aside the question of possible conflicts between the under-
writers as a group and other defendants with respect to settlement, let
us focus on the situation as among the several underwriters who have
themselves been sued. Each underwriter, of course, has the theoretical
right to compromise the claim against him individually, but in prac-
tice there is unlikely to be a settlement unless a sizable portion of the
group participates, and each antes up his share.8 9 The basic problem
here is that there is no mechanic for coercing all participants into a
settlement which is approved by a consensus. Thus, the participant who
declines to join will likely emerge in the most favorable position, since
the settlement will presumably be concluded in any event, he will not
have to contribute to the fund, and the case will probably be dropped
against all defendants including him. Quaere, would the settling under
writers then be entitled to claim contribution from those who did not
participate in, but were benefited by, the settlement?9"
If the manager alone is sued, and does not wish to (or unsuccess-
fully attempts to) implead the participants, it is an open question
whether the manager can obtain contribution from the participants
for amounts paid in settlement of the original claim. The answer lies
in the proper interpretation of the phrase "becomes liable to make
payment" contained in section 11(f). If, as would seem the case, this
were construed only to mean payments resulting from a judgment,
then the manager would be denied contribution. 91 -
Typically, where the several underwriters are named as defend-
89 See Lyons v. Marrud, Inc., 1972-1978 Transter Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. RE..
93,525 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), for a court-approved settlement involving underwriters.
90 See note 88 infra. This also raises another question: if the participants settled while
the manager did not, and the manager was ultimately held liable in the suit, could the
manager still obtain contribution? See generally 13RossER, supra note 63, at 809.
91 Certain states permit a settling tortfeasor to recover contribution if he can prove
(1) that he and the contributors would have been liable on the original claim, (2) the
amount of damage that would have been awarded on such claim in a judgment, and (3) the
reasonableness of the settlement -not an insubstantial 'burden. See PROSSER, supra note
63, at 308-9.
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ants in a lawsuit, the practice has been for the manager to assume the
laboring oar in coordinating the defense. In this regard, the manager
usually selects legal counsel, who is then retained individually by each
of the participants. 9 A fee-sharing arrangement is worked out, which
may (but need not necessarily) be in relation to the respective under-
writing positions.
Of course, no participant need accept representation by the com-
mon counsel, and each can insist on selecting his own attorney. This
is particularly pertinent if there is likely to be an issue raised as to
the relative degrees of fault as between the manager, on the one hand,
and the participants, on the other - an issue which would place a
single law firm in a rather delicate conflict of interest position. Where
separate counsel is chosen, his fee is paid by his client; and presumably
that client does not share in the fee of the common counsel, although
such client may benefit from the efforts undertaken by the common
counsel on behalf of all the underwriter-defendants.
In a lawsuit where only the manager is named, if he successfully
impleads the participants, they will presumably retain independent
counsel and not share in the fee of the manager's counsel. If all are
then found liable, although there will be contribution for the judg-
ment, it would seem unlikely that the manager will be able to seek
contribution for his legal fees. If impleader is unsuccessful, it is an
open question whether the participants can be forced to contribute to
the manager's legal fees. 93
IV. SOME RECENT ATTEMPTS TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM
The Intervention of the Commission and the NASD
Not to be outdone by the courts, and spurred on by the "hot issue"
abuses of that now almost forgotten era (1966-1968) of Adam Smith's
The Money Game,94 the Commission has singled out the due diligence
investigation as a possibly effective means of preventing the prolifera-
9 2 1n BarChris, for example, all of the underwriters were represented by one firm.
283 F. Supp. at 651. It should be noted that certain problems may be raised if the counsel
selected to defend the action is the same law firm which acted as counsel to the under-
writers in connection with the offering which is the subject of the suit. See ABA CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmILrrY DR 5-101(b). This rule provides that a firm should not accept
employment in pending or contemplated litigation if it is apparent that an attorney in
the firm ought to be called as a witness, unless such refusal would cause a substantial
hardship to the client. The matter is particularly sensitive where it can be reasonably fore-
seen that some of the key issues in the lawsuit will be the adequacy of the due diligence
investigation by such attorneys. See BarChris, supra, at 692-97; Feit, 332 F. Supp. at 582-83,
in which attorneys figured prominently in the due diligence investigation.
93 See text accompanying note 88 supra relating to the interpretation of the phrase
"becomes liable to make payment" contained in section ll(f).
94 See A. SMITH, THE MONEY GAME (1968).
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tion of highly speculative issues and excesses of the after-market.95 The
Commission appears to view the due diligence investigation as, in ef-
fect, quality-control testing of securities, the results of which should
find its way into the hands of the investing public.
To implement this concept, the Commission directed the NASD90
to consider and propose regulations concerning the nature and scope of
the due diligence investigation itself, the qualifications of those making
the investigation, the need for a report of the results by the manager to
the participants, and the function of the due diligence meeting.97
In response to the Commission's concerns, the NASD has pro-
posed9 that each managing underwriter establish written procedures
which it would be required to follow in connection with its investiga-
tion of a particular issuer.9 These procedures would include, as a mini-
mum, a review of and investigation into some fifteen items, such as
corporate books, financial statements, budgets, backlog and business
relationships. Rather than requiring the manager to report the results
of such investigations to the participants, the NASD has proposed that
the manager certify in the Agreement Among that it has developed
adequate procedures and has in fact followed such procedures in con-
nection with .that particular underwriting.100
This certification concept raised the ire of the Securities Industry
Association (SIA), the trade association of the investment banking
community. In the SIAs view, implicit in the proposed certification is
the shifting of the entire risk of the due diligence investigation from
the participants to the manager, for all practical purposes depriving the
manager of the benefits of limited liability under section 11(e) of the
1933 Act.101 In place of certification, the SIA suggests that the manager
be required to make an oral presentation about its investigation at the
due diligence meeting, thus attempting to breathe new life into that
tired gathering and to provide a basis for the participants' own due
diligence defense.102
95 See generally SEC Securities Act Release No. 5275 (July 26, 1972).
06 Id.
97 Id. Presumably, the existence of the report and an upgrading of the due diligence
meeting would be helpful to the participants in establishing their due diligence defense.
See note 73 supra.
98 See generally Notice to All NASD Members and Interested Persons (March 14, 1973),
proposing certain additions and amendments to the Rules of Fair Practice.
99 Id. at 9-13.
100 Id. at 12.
101 Letter from Stephen M. DuBrul, Jr., Chairman, SIA, Corporate Finance Division, to
Donald H. Burns, Secretary of the NASD, April 10, 1973, at 5, on file at St. John's Law
Review.
102 Id. at 6.
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The status of these various proposals is currently in limbo, al-
though it is understood that the Commission and the NASD are en-
gaged in discussions with regard to the SIA's objections. Prior to the
adoption of any NASD due diligence policy, it is expected that new
amendments will be circulated for comment.
Contractual Efforts by Underwriters
Some managing underwriters have attempted to remedy this situa-
tion by inserting provisions in the Agreement Among relating to the
matters herein discussed.10 3 In general, those that we have reviewed
tend to give far-reaching power to the manager, enabling him unilater-
ally to select counsel, handle all litigation, make the decision to settle,
and require all the participating underwriters to share proportionately
(on the basis of underwriting commitment) in any judgments, settle-
ment amounts and expenses incurred by the manager as a result of
the underwriting, regardless of whether or not the participating under-
writers are named.
It can be argued that this approach centralizes too much power in
the hands of the manager and is unfair to the participants. There are
no requirements for notice, no recognition is given to the degree of
the manager's fault, and the participants have no say in the all-
important question of settlement. Furthermore, a number of nuances
and necessary mechanical provisions are omitted.
The Model Federal Securities Code
In recent years, a number of eminent legal scholars and attorneys,
under the leadership of Professor Louis Loss and the auspices of the
American Law Institute, have been engaged in drafting a proposed
Federal Securities Code. One of the stated major purposes of this
comprehensive revision of the federal securities laws is "to correlate
and clarify the bases and the scope of liability and of defenses, pro-
posing reasonable limits . "104 to the liabilities existing under the
present framework.
The primary provision of the proposed Code relating to under-
writers' liability for a misrepresentation or a material omission in an
offering statement (the successor under the new framework to the cur-
rent Registration Statement and Prospectus) is generally similar to
103 See, e.g., Agreement Among Underwriterd 5-6 (April 10, 1972), filed with the Com-
mission in connection with the public offering of 1,300,000 common shares of Integrated
Resources, Inc.
104 ALI FEDERAL SEcUarris CODE at vii (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973).
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section 11,105 and carries forward the limitations on liability currently
contained in sections 1 (e) and (g).106 The Code adopts the basic under-
writers' defense of due diligence, emphasizing the reasonableness of the
underwriters' investigation,'0 7 but with a new twist: the standard of
reasonableness is that of a prudent man "under the circumstances"
(rather than the existing phrase, "in the management of his own prop-
erty"); and one of such circumstances referred to specifically is "the role
of a particular defendant as an underwriter."108 Although the Comment
to this section 0 refers only to permitted discrimination between "ordi-
nary and 'technical' underwriters,"110 it would appear that the drafts-
men may possibly be laying the groundwork for the establishment of
differing due diligence standards as between managing and partici-
pating underwriters.
On the issue of indemnification, the proposed Code follows the
lead of Globus I in declaring an indemnification contract unenforce-
able if the indemnified party is guilty of, in the words of the Code, "bad
faith, willful misfeasance, gross negligence, or reckless disregard of the
duties involved in the conduct of his office.""' Subject to this limita-
tion, the proposed statute explicitly provides that persons liable under
the Code may contractually allocate liability among themselves, either
before or after liability is imposed." 2 Significantly for our purposes,
the relevant Comment 13 indicates that, although section 11 of the
1933 Act contains no similar express provision sanctioning contractual
contribution before the fact, the draftsmen believe that such a right
can be implied under section 11(f) and under sections 9(e) and 18(b)
of the 1934 Act." 4
In the absence of a contract governing contribution, the Code
permits the court wide discretion to order contribution among multiple
defendants in a "just and equitable" manner, on the basis of the rela-
10 Id. § 1403. See also Introductory Memorandum at xx, =xvii-,xviii.
1061d. § 1403(g)(1)(C) & (B).
1071d. § 1403(e)(4).
108 Id. § 1403(f)(6).
109 Id. § 1403, Comment 10(c).
110 "Technical" presumably refers to a person who is not underwriting an offering of
securities in the traditional sense but who has underwriter status thrust upon him; e.g.,
under Staff interpretations, a person who purchases more than 10% of a registered offering
and then turns around to resell the securities.
111 ALI FEDERAL Scuarnms CoDE § 1418(e)(3)(B) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973). Moreover,
the proposed statute explicitly gives the Commission broad rule-making power to render
indemnification contracts unenforceable or enforceable only after judicial approval. Id.
§ 1418(e)(4).
112 d. § 1418(f)(1).
113 Id. § 1418(f), Comment (1).
114 Id., citing Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YA L.J. 171, 178
(1933).
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tive responsibility of each person for the loss incurred.115 If this con-
cept of comparative fault were to be enacted into law, one would ex-
pect it to provide managing underwriters with compelling incentives
to adopt the kind of contractual approach recommended in this article,
rather than undergo the vagaries of unpredictable judges and jurors.
In any event, the Federal Securities Code remains today in the
tentative draft stage, and will not even be submitted for consideration
to legislative authorities for some years."16 Thus, the emphasis at the
present time must focus on solutions derived by the parties at risk.
V. A SUGGESTED PRACTICAL APPROACH
Synopsis of the Situation
We have seen, in the prior discussion, how the underwriting com-
munity, which is being subjected to an increasing volume of lawsuits,
also faces the unhappy prospect of emerging bloody and bowed from
these tribulations - even where the underwriters in question have
not been intentionally or recklessly derelict in fulfilling their obliga-
tions. Among the factors contributing to this gloomy outlook have been
the increasing difficulty (as illustrated in the BarChris and Feit cases)
of establishing judicially their due diligence defense;" 7 the exposure to
larger judgments caused by plaintiffs' reliance on rule lOb-5, which
has eroded underwriters' statutory damage limitations;" 8 and the now
questionable ability of underwriters, in the wake of Globus I, to shift
the liability burden to other parties involved in the underwriting
through indemnification provisions which may be deemed contrary
to public policy." 9
Coupled with these discernable trends toward greater monetary
exposure, there has been a recognition that the numerous uncertain as-
pects in such a fragmentary and fast-changing area of the law greatly
exacerbate an already difficult situation. A good deal of vagueness still
exists with respect to (1) the scope and direction of rule lOb-5 liabil-
ity,120 (2) the availability of contribution in the rule 1Ob-5 context as a
means of liability sharing,121 (3) possible differing due diligence stan-
dards between managing and participating underwriters, 122 and (4) the
115 ALl FEmERAL SEcurTms CODE § 1418(f)(2) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973).
116 See Loss, Status of the Federal Securities Code, 170 N.Y.L.J. 110, Dec. 10, 1973, at
1, col. 2.
117 See text accompanying note 56 supra.
118 See text accompanying notes 47-54 supra.
119 See text accompanying notes 69-70 supra.
120 See note 49 supra.
121 See text accompanying note 74 supra.
122 See note 76 supra.
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means of handling such issues as settlements, legal representation and
legal fees.123 Compounding these problems further are the additional
uncertainties introduced by the happenstance of who among the under-
-writers gets sued.
The burdens of increased liability and uncertainty descend with
particular force on the managing underwriter. He will invariably be a
subject of the lawsuit, perhaps with others but very possibly alone.
Since his employees undertake the principal due diligence activities,124
he will be asked to bear direct responsibility for any mistakes. He will
be forced to retain attorneys in any dispute, and the attorneys will look
to him for their fees. He will be particularly interested in the question
of settlement, both to protect his own reputation and to reduce any
potential monetary liability.
A Rationale for Risk Sharing
The central issue that must be addressed in attempting to frame
a practical approach for removing the subject of relative underwriters'
liability from the existing confusion is whether the manager should be
placed in the position of bearing the full risk of litigation liability -
in effect, indemnifying the participants against liabilities resulting from
the manager's handling of a particular offering - or whether some
sharing of the litigation risks is more appropriate.
Undoubtedly, a plausible argument could be fashioned in favor
of shifting the full weight onto the shoulders of the managing under-
writer. After all, it is the manager who makes the basic decision to
bring an issuer public - introducing it, so to speak, to the Street - or,
in the case of a secondary offering, to return the company to the public
fount. By placing his name on the cover page of the prospectus, the man-
ager puts his reputation for acumen and probity on the line with the
issuer, for all investors to see and heed. Since the managing under-
writer is charged with the duty of making the due diligence investiga-
tion on behalf of the syndicate,'125 it does not seem illogical that the
manager should bear the responsibility for a faulty decision or investi-
gation. The essence of the system is that participating underwriters have
almost no opportunity to undertake an independent investigation and
possess little more information upon which to base their underwriting
decision than is furnished to the average investor. 2 The manager
reaps the principal rewards from the underwriting, both financial (in
123 See text accompanying notes 89-93 supra.
24 See text acompanying note 30 supra.
125 Id.
126 See text accompanying note 33 supra.
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terms of his management fee and presumably greater share of the
securities offered)127 and nonfinancial (in the sense of peer recognition
for shepherding the offering to successful consummation). Finally, to the
extent that such an approach might impose greater financial risks on
the manager, this can be ameliorated in classic self-insurer fashion by
permitting the manager to retain additional compensation in the
form of higher management fees, or a separate charge to the partici-
pants for the costs of the due diligence investigation, or otherwise.12
In our view, however, this approach is not ultimately supportable
and would produce unwarranted results. It runs counter to the theo-
retical basis of syndication, which developed as a means of protecting
individual investment banking houses against undue risks in an under-
writing. It can be viewed as being inconsistent with the same kind of
public policy considerations that have decimated issuer-underwriter
indemnification agreements. 129 In practical terms, it could have the
effect of undermining the financial stability of particular underwriters,
to the detriment of the investment banking community as a whole; the
potentiality of a number of small litigation losses seems decidedly
preferable to the prospect of one or two possibly fatal judgments.
On the other hand, a contractual undertaking designed to spread
the risk among the manager and participants, provided it contains ap-
propriate safeguards against abuse, is peculiarly well suited to an in-
dustry which abhors uncertainty and unnecessary litigation, which much
prefers the discipline of self-regulation to the twin spectres of judicially
imposed solutions and regulatory fiats, and in which any particular
investment banker can never be sure whose ox is being gored as he
shifts from manager to participant on a daily basis.
Certain Criteria for the Accord
In attempting to draft a provision for use in the Agreement
Among to resolve the problems of litigation risk sharing, we had in
mind the necessity that it should fulfill several basic criteria in order
to function properly. The principal aims (in no particular order of
priority) are as follows:
1. To create a maximum of certainty, consistent with brevity
and an appreciation of the inherently fluctuating nature of
abstruse legal concepts;
127 See note 31 supra; text accompanying notes 36-37 supra.
128 See Note, Section 11 of the Securities Act: The Unresolved Dilemma of Partici-
pating Underwriters, 40 FoRiDHAm L. REv. 869, 895-96 (1972).
129 See text accompanying notes 66-70 supra. Under such an approach the manager
could be viewed to be indemnifying the participants.
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2. To fairly allocate the risks of litigation, striving to balance
interests reasonably in rough proportion to potential rewards;
3. To define the types of claims and actions which are subject to
risk sharing;
4. To minimize, to the extent possible, substantive distinctions
based on who is sued and upon what statutory basis;
5. To be consistent with public policy, as enunciated in the
statutes and cases;
6. To agree in advance upon an expeditious and fair means of
settling claims; and
7. To provide for the selection of counsel and payment of legal
fees and other litigation expenses.
The Proposed Provision
To deal with this issue, we propose that the following section 30
be inserted in the typical Agreement Among:
[10.] Litigation. The following provisions shall apply in the
event that one or more claims (the "Claim") involving the Under-
writers generally shall hereafter be asserted against you, as Man-
aging Underwriter or otherwise, or any or all of the Underwriters
(including you), pursuant to any provisions of law, relating to any
Preliminary Prospectus, the Prospectus, the Registration Statement,
the public offering of the Stock, or any transaction contemplated by
this Agreement:
(a) You shall notify each of us promptly of the assertion
of the Claim (or, if any claim is asserted against any of us but
not you, the Underwriter against whom the Claim is asserted
shall notify you promptly thereof), and you shall keep each of
us reasonably informed of all material developments during
its pendency,
(b) We hereby authorize you to make such investigation,
to retain such counsel, to defend the Claim, and to take such
other action as you shall deem necessary or desirable under the
circumstances.
(c) Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, we
hereby authorize you to enter into a settlement of the Claim
which shall be binding upon each of us, provided that you re-
ceive the written consent of such settlement of Underwriters
130 Obviously, the form of the quoted provision will differ according to the style of
the draftsman and the necessity of integrating it with the remainder of the Agreement
Among. The quoted provision is intended for use in an Agreement Among which is in
the form of a letter from the participating underwriters (referred to as "we') to the man-
ager (referred to as "you'). The structure of a series of subparagraphs was utilized to point
up the components of the provision; if and when used in practice, the paragraph can ob-
viously be rendered in more discursive form.
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representing at least 66-2/% of the underwriting obligations
hereunder.
(d) Upon request by you made from time to time, we
agree (subject to subparagraph (f) hereof) to pay our propor-
tionate share (as defined in subparagraph (e)) of (i) all expenses
incurred by you (including, but not limited to, the disburse-
ments and fees of counsel retained by you) in connection with
the activities referred to in subparagraph (b), and (ii) any lia-
bility incurred by you or any of the Underwriters in respect of
the Claim, whether such liability shall be the result of a judg-
ment or the result of any settlement pursuant to subparagraph
(c).
(e) For purposes of subparagraph (c), "proportionate
share" shall mean a fraction of which the numerator shall be
the underwriting obligation hereunder of the contributing
Underwriter and the denominator shall be the aggregate of
the underwriting obligations hereunder. If any of the Under-
writers defaults in the payment of its proportionate share, any
amount of such payment remaining ultimately uncollected
shall be apportioned among the remaining underwriters in
accordance with the prior sentence (except that the denomi-
nator shall be reduced by all or an equitable portion of the
defaulting underwriter's obligations hereunder).
(f) Nothing contained herein shall require any of us to
make any payment to you of any such expenses or liability
incurred by you as a result of a judgment against you or settle-
ment, if you have been adjudged by a court of competent
jurisdiction (which judgment has not been reversed on appeal)
to be guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation, intentional wrong-
doing, wanton or reckless behavior, or gross negligence, and the
Underwriter otherwise required to make any such payment
hereunder has not been adjudged to be guilty of any of the
foregoing. In such instance, you will refund promptly all par-
tial payments of expenses previously made by us.
(g) Nothing contained herein shall in any way be con-
strued to limit any rights you or we may have to recover con-
tribution under the provisions of applicable law.
Let us now examine certain aspects of the proposed paragraph.
Litigation Situations to Which Applicable: The provision comes
into play where any claim is "asserted against you, as Managing Under-
writer or otherwise, or any or all of the Underwriters (including you)."
Thus, no distinction is drawn between a claim solely against the man-
ager, or against the underwriters generally (including the manager),
nor does it matter whether the manager is sued in his individual or
representative capacity.
Type of Claim Covered: The provision covers claims, relating to
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the offering and offering documents, "involving the underwriters gen-
erally." This is intended to limit its operation only to those claims
which apply to the underwriting syndicate as a whole. Thus, claims
based on violations peculiar to an individual firm or its employees,
such as improper sales activity involving breaches of the suitability 31
or margin rules, 32 would not be covered by the provision. Among the
more common types of claims within the scope of the clause would be
those based on violations of section 11, section 12(2)133 and section
17134 of the 1933 Act and rule lOb-5 under the 1934 Act. Others include
those resulting from violations of the "blue sky laws"'135 and of rules
lOb-6 30 and lOb-7137 under the 1934 Act relating to market making
and stabilization during the offering. The provision does not operate
with respect to claims concerning the underwriting agreement between
the underwriters and the issuer (such as failure on the part of the un-
derwriters to perform their purchase obligation), since this could be
deemed to be an intrusion on the concept of severality1 38
Losses Subject to Allocation: There is mandatory contribution for
all expenses incurred by the manager in connection with the defense of
the claim, including fees of counsel of his choice, as well as any liability.
The liability may be the result of a judgment against the manager,
or any of the underwriters, or of a settlement pursuant to the applicable
provisions of the clause.
Allocation of Losses: Each underwriter's proportionate share of li-
ability and expenses is based on his respective underwriting obligation.
Litigation Procedures and Settlement: The clause enables the
manager to assume a large measure of control with respect to any result-
ing lawsuit. The manager may select counsel, investigate the claim,
and defend against it. The provision does not prohibit the participants
from retaining their own counsel, but they nevertheless remain ob-
ligated to pay a proportionate share of the manager's litigation ex-
penses. The manager would be in a position to negotiate a proposed
compromise, but would have to obtain written consent to any binding
131 NASD MANUAL- RULES OF FAIR PRACTICE art. III, § 2, CCH NASD SECURMES
DEALERS MANUAL f 2152 (1968).
132 1934 Act § 7; Federal Reserve Board, Reg. T, 12 C.F.R. § 220.1 et seq. (1973).
133 1933 Act § 12(2).
134 1933 Act § 17.
135 However, a blue sky violation based on the claim that an individual underwriter
sold securities in a state in which the issue was not registered (after having been advised
by the manager of such lack of registration) would not come under the operative provisions
of the clause. See generally L. Loss & E. Cowvrr, BLUE SKY LAW (1958).
136 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6 (1973).
137 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-7 (1973).
138 See text accompanying notes 41-44 supra.
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settlement by underwriters (including the manager himself) represent-
ing a minimum of 66-2/3 percent of the underwriting obligations. These
procedures would operate both where the manager alone was named
in the action and where other underwriters were joined.
Exceptions: No contribution is required under the provision if
the manager is adjudicated to be "guilty of fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion, intentional wrongdoing, wanton or reckless behavior, or gross
negligence"'31 9 and the potential contributor is not. The purpose of this
clause is to draw a distinction between ordinary negligence on the
manager's part and more grievous standards of behavior, limiting his
contractual right of contribution from the participants in most cases
to the former situation. The purpose of the final proviso in subpara-
graph (g) is to negate any inference that the manager would be re-
stricted from asserting any statutory right that he might have against
the participants, or vice versa.
An Appraisal of the Provision
We will now examine the provision in terms of the various cri-
teria postulated above.
A. Certainty
While not solving all possible problems, the provision creates a
substantially greater degree of certainty than exists in the current un-
derwriting context. It extends contribution to cases under rule lOb-5
and other areas not covered by section 1 (f). It encompasses within the
ambit of risk sharing amounts paid by way of settlement and litigation
expenses incurred. And it attempts to clarify certain other aspects of
contribution that might otherwise be subject to question.140
On the other hand, in denying the manager's right of contribution
in those instances where he alone is judged to have been grossly neg-
ligent or worse, certain additional variables based on behavioral dis-
tinctions are introduced. The problems in making determinations on
the basis of a characterization of behavior, however, would seem less
troublesome than the difficult question raised by uncertainty as to the
existence and scope of contribution. The concept of "fraudulent mis-
representation" already exists in the statutory scheme of contribution,
and judges and attorneys are often called upon in other situations to
make the kinds of distinctions introduced by the provision; e.g., the
139 The proposed Federal Securities Code contains an essentially similar characteriza-
tion, "bad faith, willful misfeasance, gross negligence, or reckless disregard of the duties in
volved in the conduct of his office." See text accompanying note 111 supra.
140 See text accompanying notes 143-45 infra.
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decision by a court whether or not to award punitive damages; and the
decision by counsel (which may ultimately be subjected to judicial
scrutiny) in advising a corporation as to whether it may or should
indemnify a director.
An analysis of the due diligence process should enable under-
writers and their attorneys to reach some conclusions so as to make this
aspect of the clause work smoothly in practice. For example, any under-
writer who has not established adequate procedures with respect to an
investigation or who, having established such procedures, has made
little or no attempt to carry them out, would certainly fall into the
gross negligence category. On the other hand, a manager who had
adopted proper procedures but who failed to consider or discover some
adverse fact or who made an error in judgment, while perhaps neg-
ligent, should still retain the right of contribution.
B. Fairness
The provision represents an attempt to strike a rough balance be-
tween the extremes of (1) subjecting the manager to total liability with-
out any contractual rights to contribution, and (2) providing for con,
tractual contribution in every case, notwithstanding the circumstances.
The device employed to draw that line is the distinction between negli-
gence and more odious forms of behavior. In effect, participating un-
derwriters are being asked to assume the risk that the manager's due
diligence investigation and prospectus-writing skills do not measure
up to the high standards imposed by law in this complex area -just
as they assume the risk of the manager's acumen in analyzing the busi-
ness and prospects of the issuer in terms of the quality of its securities
over the longer term. However, the participants should not be, and are
not being, asked to assume the risks that the manager will knowingly
participate in a fraudulent scheme or will be so derelict in the perfor-
mance of his functions as to exceed the bounds of ordinary negligence,
By relating the sharing of the litigation risk to the respective un-
derwriting obligations, the provision seeks a rational apportionment
of potential liability among the underwriters in terms of what they
stand to gain from the transaction. This is in contrast to more arbitrary
possibilities with respect to sharing losses.141
There are, to be sure, other logical possibilities for risk sharing. For
example, certain underwriters do profit from an offering in greater
proportion than their respective underwriting positions; the manager
receives a special fee for the discharge of his responsibilities, and par-
141 See note 77 supra.
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ticular underwriters end up selling securities in excess of their under-
writing commitments. 142 It would not be unwarranted to increase their
share of the burden proportionately, with particular justification in
the case of the manager, since his is usually the primary fault.
Nevertheless, our preference is to base liability on the purely un-
derwriting (or risk-taking) aspect of the transaction. In viewing the
three components of underwriting compensation - the management
fee, the underwriting commission, and the selling concession - it is
clear that the one most directly related to the risk-taking function is the
underwriting commission. The management fee is normally allocated
to the managing underwriter's corporate finance department for its ef-
forts in finding clients and preparing the offering. The selling conces-
sion is credited to a firm's sales offices for placing the securities and
compensating the salesman. The underwriting commission, however,
is retained by the syndicate department as a fee for the use of the firm's
capital, and the risks to which it is put, of which liability from potential
litigation is certainly a major constituent.
C. Claims Covered
The rationale underlying the scope of coverage of the provision is
to limit risk-sharing principles to those violations based on activities
which are undertaken on behalf of the syndicate as a whole, while leav-
ing the underwriters, including the manager, responsible for their in-
dividual errors and wrongs. To do otherwise would be to subject man-
ager and participants alike to risks not comprehended by the syndicate
concept of limited joint effort. The alternative of listing the specific
types of claims to be covered seemed less practicable, particularly since
courts may in the future judicially impose new liabilities for under-
writers after the fact. 143
Basing the manager's right of contribution on his conduct properly
focuses attention on a determination of how the manager discharged
his obligations in the underwriting, and avoids to a large degree the
fortuitous aspects of whether or not the plaintiff chooses to bring an
action under section 11 or rule 1Ob-5 or any other provision of law.
While it does not solve the question of whether negligent behavior is
actionable under rule lOb-5,144 it does mitigate some of the more
draconian effects of a large potential loss for the manager by assuring
142 See notes 34-37 and accompanying text supra.
143 A case in point has been the expansion of rule lOb-5 liability into this area. See
notes 47-52 and accompanying text supra.
144 See note 49 supra.
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for him a right of contribution under rule lOb-5 so long as his conduct
was no worse than negligent.
D. Minimize Distinctions
One of the troublesome possibilities under the current state of
affairs is that, in a lawsuit concerning the underwriting generally, a
managing underwriter could potentially be forced to shoulder the bur-
den of an entire judgment for no reason other than the fact that he was
the only underwriter to be sued. The clause's operative provisions pro-
vide for uniformity of economic outcome, irrespective of who among
the underwriters gets sued.1 45
E. Public Policy
We take our cue here from court decisions with respect to due
diligence and indemnification. 146 The holding of the BarChris case
can be viewed as a strong expression of public concern that under-
writers adhere to high standards in connection with the public offer-
ing of securities. Each underwriter has an obligation to investigate,
within the limits of reasonableness, the veracity and completeness of
the statements made about the issuer, its business and the details of the
offering. And, although this obligation may properly be delegated to
another party, each underwriter must still bear liability if he has not
fulfilled his obligation.
The corollary to the BarChris axiom was enunciated in the Globus
I case - namely, that careful scrutiny must be given to any device
which may tend to make underwriters less likely to fulfill, or be less
careful in carrying out, their obligations; and that, if necessary, such
device should be condemned as contrary to the public good.
Does the contribution scheme enunciated in the provision con-
travene these public policy objectives - does it encourage underwriters
to be lax in their necessary due diligence obligations? The argument
can be made that the contractual right to contribution might tend to
make the manager less careful in his due diligence, because of his antic-
ipation of partial reimbursement by the participants for any losses he
might suffer. However, as contrasted with indemnification, the man-
ager who can count on contribution still retains a substantial exposure
to financial loss, as well as damages to reputation. Since the 1933 Act
145 This also applies to the highly unlikely situation where, in an action by a third
party, the manager is not sued, but some of the participants are. The participants could
then, under appropriate circumstances, invoke the right of contribution against the man-
ager or other participants for their proportionate share.
146 See generally text accompanying notes 54-61 & 66-70 supra.
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itself contains provisions which generally limit each underwriter's lia-
bility,147 it would appear the retention of a consideiable risk of loss is
sufficient to avoid contravening policy.14 8
The inclusion of a right of contribution in the 1933 Act, to reverse
the common law rule of no contribution among joint tortfeasors, was
a means of insuring that all persons involved in an offering would be
exposed to the sanction of potential liability. The provision simply
carries this rationale one step further.149
F. Settlement
In the absence of an express agreement on the subject, if the man-
ager (or a participant) desires to settle a lawsuit or claim, and seeks
proportionate contribution to the settlement, each defendant has the
individual right to refuse to participate in the settlement. To the ex-
tent that the settlement is consummated without the participation of
certain defendants, they will probably receive the benefit of the suit
being dropped against them without having to foot their share of the
bill. One of the more desirable aspects of a contractual provision is to
enable the underwriters acting as a group to effectuate a fair and ex-
peditious settlement, binding on all. The issue of settlement is, of
course, particularly important to the manager as a means of saving
considerable expense (both in terms of dollars and time) and of avoid-
ing unnecessary damage to his reputation.
We have attempted to avoid the possible extremes in designing
this part of the provision. The solution utilized by others 50 - allowing
the manager alone to control completely the decision of whether or
not to compromise a claim and requiring contribution from all partici-
pants - was deemed unwise, since it might well have the effect of en-
couraging the manager to settle at too handsome a premium, especially
in difficult cases where the manager's conduct has been seriously called
into question. On the other hand, to require virtual unanimity among
the underwriters for any settlement could seriously jeopardize the man-
ager's ability to receive contribution to a reasonable settlement.
Our resolution of this matter concededly represents a compromise
position. By requiring the consent of underwriters representing 6 6-2/
147 Each underwriter's liability is limited to the dollar amount of securities actually
underwritten by him. See notes 51-52 and accompanying text supra.
148 This view is supported by the draftsmen of the Model Federal Securities Code.
See text accompanying note 114 supra.
149 Furthermore, In spreading the risk and avoiding the impact of large adverse
judgments on one investment banker, the clause assists in the preservation of a viable
capital market, which is in the general interests of all investors.
150 See text accompanying note 103 supra.
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percent of the total underwriting commitment and making it then
binding on all, the parties are saying, in effect, that when this substan-
tial majority of the group feels it is appropriate to terminate the law-
suit, there should be an end. The manager, with his presumably large
underwriting share, retains a very influential position, but is unable
to force settlement without consent of a substantial number of the par-
ticipants. Thus, in order for the settlement to be approved, the man-
ager must present a convincing case of its propriety to the participants
- but he need not be concerned that a small number of recalcitrant
participants can block the compromise.
We recognize that, since the manager's right of contribution is
denied to him in cases where he alone is adjudged to have been guilty
of gross negligence or worse conduct, he might be overly anxious to
settle in instances where he has been severely remiss in the discharge
of his duties, rather than risk an adverse court determination. How-
ever, the safeguard of partial participant consent to the settlement
should work here; if the participants believe the manager to have been
grossly negligent or worse, they can and should withhold their consent
to settlement, thus forcing him either to settle with his own money or
face the consequences of a trial.
G. Counsel and Expenses
The clause provides for the manager to select counsel of his choice
to handle the defense of a lawsuit related to the underwriting. This
does not appear to be an inappropriate grant of authority, since the
participating underwriters have already given their tacit consent for
the manager to select the counsel who will represent the underwriters
in handling the offering itself. Such counsel's fees and other litigation
expenses are to be shared in the same proportion as a judgment or
settlement amount would be shared, with provision for periodic pay-
ments (so that the manager will not have to carry the load unilaterally)
which are reimbursable by the manager if contribution is ultimately
not warranted.
Since there may be potential conflicting interests between the man-
ager and the participants, there is no prohibition on any participant's
retaining counsel of his own.l l' Ethical considerations would mandate
that the manager's counsel disclose to the participants the potential con-
flicts and the consequences thereof, before accepting any multiple rep-
resentation. 152 And, at least in some instances, the safest course might
1 5 1 See generally ABA CODE OF PROFE.sIoNAL RESPONSIBILTrY, EC 5-16.
152 Id.
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be for the participants as a whole to retain their own counsel at the
outset, at least for the purpose of independent advice as to contribu-
tion.
At first blush, it may seem unfair that the participants are required
to share in the manager's litigation expenses and counsel fees, particu-
larly in a situation where they retain their own attorneys.1r5 The prem-
ise underlying this concept, however, is that the participants will be
performing little, if any, independent due diligence, and thus their
success or failure in the litigation will derive from the ability of the
manager to sustain his due diligence defense. Thus, it does not seem to
us inappropriate, at least in terms of current underwriting practice,
for the participants to share in the costs of the defense.
VI. CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing criteria, the provision appears to be
satisfactory. Undoubtedly, other criteria could be established, under
which the provision might or might not fare so well. And, to be sure,
there still remain some difficult questions.
The basic problem, in our view, comes down to the question of
whether a participating underwriter, who has neither been particu-
larly diligent nor negligent on his own, should be forced to share the
liabilities of a negligent manager. There will undoubtedly be some
underwriters who will prefer to take their chances, on what may be
termed the hard-nosed theory, to wit: when they are manager, their
due diligence will be sufficiently thorough that no contribution will be
needed; and when they are participants, they would like to preserve
complete freedom of action in dealing with a negligent manager. Or,
to phrase the same thing another way, they are willing to accept mar-
ket risks but not the hazard of incompetence.
The simple answer to this position is that the participants can't
both have their cake and eat it too. If they are going to rely on the
manager's due diligence, they should be willing to abide by the results.
If the manager descends to the level of gross negligence or fraud, which
by its nature is not a reasonably foreseeable risk for the participant,
then they should be free to deal with that situation; but short of that,
they must sink or swim on the manager's back. And since this seems to
be the learning of the few cases on the subject,154 it is not a situation of
imposing a new standard of liability on participants.
153 Even with the participants employing separate counsel, however, it is obvious that
the efforts of the manager's counsel can be for the ultimate benefit of the participants,
since to the extent the manager's due diligence defense is established the participants will
likely be absolved.
154 See text accompanying notes 58-59 supra.
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However, if this problem proves indigestible, one possibility to
minimize its impact would be to make express provision for the par-
ticipant who wishes to go it alone.0 5 To be sure, this runs counter to
prevailing syndication practice, and it would certainly be unlikely that
any single participant would choose this course of action. However,
under extreme circumstances, a group of participants could conceivably
band together for this purpose; and it might be thought to provide a
useful safety valve for underwriters who are disinclined to assume the
risk. To the extent that such a choice encourages increased diligence
among the participants, it serves the statutory purpose; to the extent,
however, that it fosters duplication of effort and an implicit lack of
confidence in the manager, it might be considered counter-productive.
The provision, moreover, is premised on the concept of derivative
liability5 6 in a legal context in which neither the statutes nor the
courts have recognized any distinction between the manager's and the
participants' due diligence obligations. 157 Judicial recognition of a
lesser standard of due diligence for participants, as has been suggested
by the Commission, 58 could have the effect of providing participants
with incentives for undertaking some basic due diligence, which occurs
only rarely at present. If a lower standard were recognized (and if the
participants could reasonably and economically meet it), it would be
appropriate to revise the clause, denying the manager contribution
from a participant when that participant sustained his defense, as is
currently provided in section 11(f). 59
These are the kind of questions that require full and forthright
discussion in the investment banking community. We hope that this
article will serve as a stimulus for further study by underwriters and
their attorneys, out of which a workable solution to the vexatious is-
sues of relative liability among underwriters will be forged.
155 For example, an additional subparagraph could be added to the clause, along the
following lines:
"(h) The provisions of this paragraph shall not apply to any Underwriter who (i) at
the time such underwriter initially signifies to you his assent to participate in this offering,
indicates in writing that he intends to conduct an independent due diligence investigation
of the issuer, (ii) conducts such investigation, (iii) within thirty days after receiving notice
of the Claim states in writing to you that he is retaining independent counsel to represent
him in defending the Claim, and (iv) is so represented. In such event, for purposes of
computation under this paragraph, the aggregate of the underwriting obligations here-
under shall be deemed to be reduced by the underwriting obligation of any such Under-
writer."
a15 See text accompanying notes 57-61 supra.
157 See notes 60 & 76 supra.
158 See text accompanying note 39 supra.
109 See text accompanying notes 69-70 supra.
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